Connect the server

Register only this server with your MCP client — do not add the general Metatron MCP for this purpose. Replace the placeholders; never commit real credentials. Use a dedicated read-only database role (never the owner or superuser) and store the password in ~/.pgpass with chmod 600.

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "leads-finder": {
      "type": "stdio",
      "command": "/opt/homebrew/bin/python3.14",
      "args": ["/path/to/leads-finder-mcp/server.py"],
      "env": {
        "LEADS_FINDER_PG_DSN": "host=<db-host> dbname=instagrowth user=leads_finder_ro connect_timeout=5",
        "LEADS_FINDER_REDIS_URL": "redis://<redis-host>:6379/0",
        "LEADS_FINDER_ACTOR": "<your-id>"
      }
    }
  }
}

Limits: 8s statement timeout · 5s connect timeout · 25 per page by default, 100 max · preview scope 25 targets / 30 pages · NATIVE_LEAD_MAX_PAGES clamped 1–30.

Security model

• Read-only at the database. Every connection sets default_transaction_read_only=on; a test confirms CREATE TABLE is rejected.

• No raw SQL input. Fixed statements with bound parameters; filters come from a closed list — unknown keys are rejected, not ignored.

• Field allow-list. Metadata JSONB and all credential-bearing tables are excluded; bios truncated to 300 characters.

• Redis is read-only. Only TYPE, LLEN, ZCARD, HLEN, GET, and EXISTS are issued.

• Audit log. Each call records timestamp, request ID, actor, tool, argument names (never values), outcome, and duration.

• Errors do not leak. Callers receive a request ID and a generic message; driver text is never returned.

Deliberately absent: no run controls. start_run, cancel_job, and retry_job are not implemented — to start a scrape, use the backend API with an authorised account. This server only reports whether a request is valid and what the status of a run is.